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Abstract
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procure-
ment auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show
that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential “out-
siders.” Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding
war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members.
It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long
and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.
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1 Introduction
Bid rigging is pervasive in public procurement auctions. As it becomes a major social
problem and attracts more public attention, the inner working of bidding rings is
gradually revealed by journalists, lawyers and industry experts some of whom were
formally involved in ring activities themselves.1 In a typical process of bid rigging,
the ring bidders gather in prior to each auction and discuss who win the auction.
According to Suzuki (2004) who documents all bid rigging cases between 1947 and
2000, typically the ring has its own “collusion scheme”, the rule under which the
ring chooses a winner.
Suzuki’s survey of a wide variety of collusion schemes reveals that a number
of rings use the history of auctions (such as the date, the identity of the winner
and other participants, and the winning price) as a basis for allocating contracts
to their members. For example, in a bid rigging case of water meter producers in
1992 in Osaka Prefecture, they calculate each ring bidder’s win amount in the past
according to a particular calculation formula, and then, the bidder who has the
least win amount among the ring bidders is chosen as the winner. In another case
of pesticide suppliers in 1998 in Osaka Prefecture, the ring used the bid rotation
scheme, in which the ring members take turns being the winner in order.
We examine the public auction data of a paving market in Japan, in order to
determine whether the bid rigging occurred. Specifically, we illustrate the correlation
between the current auction result and the past results, which is more explained by
collusion than competition. If the ring exists and uses some collusion scheme which
is based on the history, there must be a link between each auction result and the
history.
It has been pointed out that a correlation between the current result and the
past results is not necessarily due to collusion. Particularly, when bidders’ cost
functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale, bid rotation can also result from a
competitive bidding behavior. That is, firms with idle capacity have lower marginal
cost and hence, are more likely to win a contract than those with ongoing contracts
(Zona (1986), Porter and Zona (1993), Porter (2005)). Our approach discriminates
between collusive and non-collusive bid rotation by separating the effect of capacity
1Hironaka (1994), Kato (2005). McMillan (1991) also documents the formation and the opera-
tion of Japanese bid rigging.
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utilization from that of the collusion scheme. We construct variables for the used
capacity and for the priority index that determines the turn in the collusion scheme,
separately, and analyze their effect on the events of winning or losing. We can
discriminate competition and collusion by testing the independence of the events
from the priority measure of the rotation scheme.
We look at auctions for road-paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan in the
four-year period between 2002 and 2005. A remarkable characteristic of this market
is consistently high winning prices with the exception of sporadic bidding wars.2
Though there is no legal case of bid rigging filed against the bidders participating
in these auctions, it suggests the coexistence of collusion and cartel breakdown.
We first observe each incident of the bidding war and its participants, and find
that the bidding war during the data period mainly occurred when either of two
specific firms was present.3 It is supposed that the bidding wars were between the
ring and a small number of outsiders in the market, and that all the ring bidders
submitted low bids in order to prevent the outsiders from winning. We then examine
the data to see how the ring selects the winner among its members assuming that
the high prices were maintained by an all-inclusive ring which allocates contracts to
its members by some prespecified rule. We find that the ring tends to assign a win
to its member whose duration of no win is long and whose amount of win is small.
Theories of collusion in auctions highlight the role of pre-auction meeting of
bidders. The seminal paper by McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that the most
efficient bidder collusion in a first price auction is that the ring member with the
minimum cost bids at the reserve price while the other members bid high. Incentives
are provided through monetary transfers from the winner to the losers. McAfee and
McMillan also characterize efficient collusion when no side transfer is possible. It
is a static scheme in which the choice of the designed winner is independent of the
history. The analysis is extended to a repeated framework by Aoyagi (2003) and
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004), who analyze collusion without side transfer in
repeated auctions. In contrast to McAfee and McMillan’s static bid rotation, they
construct dynamic bid rotation schemes in which bid coordination is based on past
2In this paper, we use the term, a “bidding war” to indicate an auction whose winning price is
significantly lower than the other prices.
3Yanagawa et.al. (2005) reports that bidding wars tend to occur in March, the end of the fiscal
year. We observe no such seasonal pattern of bidding wars in our data.
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history.
In contrast to the theoretical literature, the inner working of the ring has at-
tracted little attention in the empirical literature although there is much empirical
work on bid rigging aiming at detecting collusion in procurement auctions.4 Most
of them illustrate how the bidding behavior of a set of collusive bidders is different
from competitive behavior.
Porter and Zona (1993) study auctions for paving works on Long Island, New
York. They divide the bid data into collusive bids and competitive bids, knowing
which bidder is collusive. In each dataset, they examine if the impact of the cost
factors such as the capacity utilization on the realization probability of the bid ranks
is consistent with competitive equilibrium. They find that in the collusive data the
estimated impacts of the cost factors on the realization of the first rank and on the
higher ranks are different, while there is not such difference in the competitive data.
Porter and Zona (1999) analyze the ring members’ bidding behavior in school milk
procurement auctions in Ohio State. They focus on the relationship between the bids
and the distance between schools and bidders, and find that the collusive bids and
the competitive bids reflect the distance differently, suggesting that the ring allocates
contracts by territory. Bajari and Ye (2003) observe the violation of two conditions,
conditional independence and exchangeability, that a competitive bidding strategy
must satisfy, using the auction data for highway construction works in the Midwest.
These approaches make full use of observable cost asymmetry among bidders by
measuring firms’ used capacity or the distance between the office and the work site.
The distinguishing feature of this paper is that we illustrate how the outcome of
auctions is consistent with a particular collusion scheme. In contrast to the previ-
ous works, we exclusively examine the identities of the winner and the participants,
ignoring the bid levels. Because the ring is very likely to be all-inclusive in most
auctions as described in Section 3.1, and if so, all the bids are phony and the bid
levels bring little information about the cost of the bidders or about how they col-
lude. In that case, instead, the identity of the winner perfectly reflects the collusive
agreement.
The collusion schemes considered in this paper are most closely related to those
analyzed by Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) and Pesendorfer (2000). Skrzypacz
4Harrington (2005) provides a thorough survey of this field.
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and Hopenhayn (2004) propose a collusion scheme named a “chips mechanism”, in
which the winner gives one chip to each loser, and when a bidder runs out of chips
he is supposed to allow other bidders to win for a specific number of periods. An
important factor in the scheme is the number of winning and losing in the past. It
is known that such a mechanism was indeed used by some bidding rings in Japan,
and the aim of the paper includes detecting this type of scheme. We name it the
“contribution point scheme”. Pesendorfer (2000) studies the difference between two
forms of cartel, in which one cartel in Florida uses side payments and the other in
Texas does not. He finds that the cartel without side payments maintains relatively
constant market shares, despite some efficiency losses from not allocating a contract
to the low cost firm, in order to maintain internal discipline. One of our targets of
detection is the scheme which keeps the balance of the members’ total revenues in
the past, which is the very scheme used by the cartel in Texas.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the market, the
auction procedure, and the data we analyze. In Section 3, we document the bidding
war and analyze its cause. We also describe the collusion schemes that we expect
to be used by the ring. In Section 4, we show the empirical model to estimate the
collusion scheme, and the estimation results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The market description
This study looks at auctions for paving contracts awarded by Ibaraki City, Osaka,
Japan, during four years between April 2002 and March 2006. In the data period,
Ibaraki City awards 139 contracts through auction. Typically, the contracted work
involves the resurfacing of local roads for hundreds of meters. The winning price
varies from 1 to 40 million yen, with an average of about 7 million yen. Figure 1
shows the winning price of each auction. An annual total of 2-3 hundred million yen
is contracted out.
Thirteen firms participated in the auctions in the data period with one firm
exiting early. Most firms do paving work as their primary business, and other
civil engineering works as secondary. Nine firms are local in the sense that their
headquarters are located within Ibaraki City, and the rest that we call “out-of-town”
firms have only a branch in the city. Table 3 describes the firms.
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2.1 Auction procedure
The auction is in the first price sealed bid format with a maximum acceptable
(reserve) price and a minimum acceptable price (henceforth a minimum price). The
minimum price is set for the purpose of prevent firms from doing low quality works.
A bidder with the lowest bid wins the contract if and only if his bid is between
the minimum price and the reserve price. Auction proceeds as follows: Prior to
each auction, the city officials estimate how much it will cost an average firm to
complete the work, taking into account material prices and the budget of the city.
The estimated price plus some profit margin is then used as the reserve price in
the auction. The minimum price is set at about 80% of the reserve price. The city
announces the reserve price and the minimum price one week before the auction.
Actual participants of the auction are chosen by the city. A limited number of
firms are nominated from a list of candidates one week before each auction. Technical
documents, which are needed to estimate the cost, are distributed to eligible bidders
at the city office at the announced date and time prior to the auction. It gives the
bidders a chance to see each other in advance and to know whether there is an
outsider. On the date of the auction, bidders gather and submit sealed bids. If
there are more than two bidders who submit the lowest bid, then the winner is
determined by a public lottery. Bidders can refrain from bidding. In our data, 10
bidders refrained from bidding in four auctions (see Table 2).
When a bidder wins an auction, he would earn profit equal to the winning price
minus the cost of doing the work. The cost of each contract is private information
of each bidder, and hence, each auction is a private value auction. However, a large
part of a bidder’s cost can be inferred by other bidders, since they operate in the
market for decades and the work is done according to a detailed specification given
by the city officials.
The number of nominated bidders depends on the reserve price of the auction.
When the reserve price is high, the number of bidders tends to be large. Table 1
summarizes the number of bids per auction.
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2.2 The data source
We have two data sources, bid data and corporate data. The bid data were provided
by Ibaraki City Office. The bid data contain the following information on every
project awarded: date of auctions, submitted bids, names of bidders, the reserve
price and the minimum price, the starting and ending dates of projects, and location
of projects.
The corporate data of each firm were provided by Construction Industry In-
formation Center’s database. The corporate data contain the number of years of
running, number of technical workers, annual sales, and profit per sales.
In the analyses, we used a variable which represents bidder’s used capacity. It
is not sufficient in capturing the firm’s used capacity as long as we see only the
contracts bought by Ibaraki City, since the firms do the works bought by private
firms and other local governments neighboring Ibaraki City. In calculating each
bidder’s used capacity, we used the data of contracts which were awarded by Osaka
Prefectural Government, as well as by Ibaraki City. Osaka Prefectural Government
is one of the major clients of firms, and provides contract data through its website.
The definition of variables is shown in Table 4.
3 Possible collusion scheme
3.1 Agreement to fight against outsiders
We describe a series of bidding wars observed in the data and infer the cause. The
observation in this section shows that most bidders bid at the minimum price in those
auctions that result in the bidding war, and that such a bidding war is triggered by
the presence of specific firms among the participants. It is natural to think that an
implicit agreement is behind such coordinated reversion to the minimum price. It
is likely that the ring bidders have an agreement to bid the minimum price when
they face an outsider in an auction. As mentioned previously, the bidders meet each
other prior to the auction. Once the existence of an outsider is confirmed, all of the
ring bidders must be instructed to bid at the minimum price in the auction.5
5Bajari and Ye (2003) models a cartel behavior when it faces outsiders in auctions. In their
model, the member with the minimum cost in the cartel submits a serious bid, and the other
member submit phony high bids. In contrast to the model, all the ring members seem to be
supposed to submit the lowest possible bid when they face an outsider in the market we analyze.
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Figure 2 shows the variance of “normalized bids” of each auction, and Figure 3
shows the “normalized winning bids” of each auction. “Normalized” means that the
bids are divided by the reserve price. As Figure 3 shows, in 123 out of 139 auctions,
winning prices are in the neighborhood of 93% of the reserve price.
On the other hand, remaining 16 contracts were won at the minimum price which
was set at 77-85% of the reserve price. We identify these 16 auctions as the bidding
wars. In no auction was the winning bid between 85% and 90% of the reserve price,
and therefore, the distribution of winning bids has a gap as shown in Figure 3.
Furthermore, in 13 incidents of the bidding war, the variance of the normalized bids
is zero as shown in Figure 2, indicating that all the bids were at the minimum price
and that the winner was determined by a public lottery.
We further show that bidding wars are mainly caused by the participation of
either of two specific firms. Figure 4 shows the participation of every firm in every
auction. The X axis shows auction ID, t = 1, 2, ..., 139, and the Y axis shows firm
ID, i = 1, 2, ..., 13. A white dot in the figure indicates that the auction was a bidding
war, and a black dot indicates that it was not. The square around a dot indicates
the winner: bidder y wins in auction x if there is a square at (x, y). For example,
the black dot with a frame at coordinate (15, 2) implies that firm 2 submitted a bid
and won in auction 15, and that the auction was not a bidding war.
In Figure 4, there exists a sequence of 4 white dots from coordinate (2, 13) to
coordinate (10, 13), which are indicated as A. The dots indicate the bidding wars
which may have been caused by the participation of firm 13. These auctions took
place during 3 months from May 2002 to July 2002. No bidding war was observed in
the absence of firm 13 in this period. It can be inferred that firm 13 is an outsider.
Firm 13 disappeared after auction 11 suggesting that it went out of the market,
perhaps because of the bidding war.
There exists another sequence of 8 white dots from coordinate (68, 8) to coor-
dinate (81, 8) indicated as B. These incidents of the bidding war during 5 months
from May 2004 to October 2004, were probably caused by the participation of firm
8. The other 53 auctions in which firm 8 bid did not result in the bidding war.
This may suggest that firm 8 stayed out of the ring only during the 5 months, and
reconciled with the ring after that.
We find that the bidding war took place whenever firm 13 was present and in
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a series of auctions during 5 months where firm 8 was present. This suggests the
existence of a ring agreement to bid the minimum price when one of the two firms
participated. We further infer that the ring must have been all-inclusive after firm
13’s exit, except the five months in which firm 8 stayed out of the ring. 12 incidents
of the bidding wars out of 16 are explained: 4 of them were caused by firm 13, and
8 were caused by firm 8. However, 4 incidents: auction 28, 78, 131 and 139 are left
unexplained. A possible interpretation is that the ring bidders failed in reaching an
agreement and switched to a competitive bidding temporarily.
The exit of firm 13 suggests that the bidding war worked as predation. It is likely
that winning a contract at the minimum price is unprofitable for most of the firms,
since the profit-to-sales ratio is 0.27% on average (Table 3). If so, we have a case of
“deep pocket predation” which is aimed at driving the outsiders out while making a
loss. When the number of the ring members is large relative to that of the outsiders,
the loss is not so severe for the ring members since they can take turns bearing the
loss and recover by earning profit of collusion in the absence of the outsiders. In
contrast, the bidding war brings about a financial difficulty to the outsider since he
either win a contract with a very low price in auctions or loses. Sooner or later, the
outsiders have to give up and leave the market or join the ring, allowing the ring to
be all inclusive and recoup losses.
Predatory bidding war in auctions is not so rare in Japan. In a case of a bridge
construction cartel which allocated public contracts to 47 firms for years, the cartel
was nearly all-inclusive in the bridge construction market. It is reported that cartel
members submitted extremely low bids, which were sometimes as low as 60% of the
reserve price when they faced an outsider in auctions, whereas they bid the reserve
price in the absence of the outsider. The low bids were aimed at preventing the
outsider from winning, even though they imply a negative profit from winning. The
member who won in the bidding war was compensated with a profitable contract
afterwards.(Asahi Shin bun May 19, 2005, Kahoku Shin pou, May 25, 2005.)
Meanwhile, the serial incidents of the bidding war in which firm 8 was targeted
can be interpreted as a punishment. The win of firm 8 in Auction No. 65, which
is just before the start of the incidents, may be the betrayal that triggered the
punishment.6
6If so, the punishment seems to be so called “stick-and-carrot” type, which gives a severe damage
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It is noteworthy that the normalized winning bids are not so high in auctions
that are not the bidding war: They are below 95% with one exception. We think this
is due to the warning made by the city officials. We find a notice near the auction
room at the city office, which says “in case that the normalized winning bid is higher
than a certain level, signing the contract is postponed and bidders are required to
show their cost estimates”. Knowing that collusion will be under investigation in
case of a high price, the ring must lower the price elaborately.
Note that the bidding wars cannot be an evidence of collusion by itself. There
still remains a possibility that there is no agreement among bidders.7 However, the
observation described above gives a strong support for the assumption we use in the
main analysis that all the bidders belong to the ring if the auction is not the bidding
war.
3.2 Operation of a collusion scheme as a comparison of bid-
ders’ priority
We next hypothesize the rules under which the winner is selected when the ring is all-
inclusive in the auction. These schemes are based on comparing its members’ priority
to win the contract. We focus on the following four classes of history dependent
schemes that are common in the past bid rigging cases.
1) Simple rotation
In a simple rotation scheme, the ring members rotate the winning right. In
the presence of the nomination process by the local government, simple rotation
chooses the winner based on the duration of winless period sustained by each
bidder. That is , a bidder is chosen as the winner if his winless period up to the
date is longer than that of any other bidder in the ring.
2) Revenue equalization
A revenue equalization scheme maintains equity of the revenue of its members
for finite periods.
7Consider a situation where the minimum price is higher than the cost of every bidder, that
is, bidders earn a positive profit even when they win at the minimum price. If firm 8 and firm
13 are known to be so low cost firms that every other bidder always expects them to bid at the
minimum price, then a series of bidding wars we observe can be an equilibrium outcome without
any agreement.
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by assigning a contract to the bidder whose total revenue as measured by the
winning amount in the past is the smallest among the members.
3) Contribution point
A contribution-point scheme chooses as the winner the bidder who has the highest
contribution point. A ring bidder earns a contribution point when he submits
a phony bid which allows another ring bidder to win. A bidder’s contribution
point is decreased once he wins.
In some cases in Japan, the ring uses a sophisticated way in calculating the contri-
bution point. For example, in a case in Tokushima City, a bidder’s contribution
point equals the sum of pt/nt for all past auctions t in which he lost, minus the
sum of ps for all past auctions s in which he won, where pt is the price and nt is
the number of bidders in auction t.8
In this paper, we consider the most simple way to calculate the contribution
point in which it equals (the total number of losing) − c ×(the total number of
winning), where c is some constant.
4) Combination
The combination scheme combines some or all elements of the above schemes.
For example, a bidding ring in Okayama prefecture used a combination of the
simple rotation scheme and the revenue equalization scheme, that is, the ring
basically uses revenue equalization scheme, and in case of a tie, they compared
the number of days elapsed from one’s last win.
Each of the above schemes is “public” in the sense that its operation depends
only on the public history such as the date of auctions, the participants, the winner’s
identity, and their bids, and not on the private information such as cost of doing
the work. A merit of these schemes is their simplicity: They do not require any
communication among bidders even when there is private information. They sustain
collusion without side transfer by giving each member the expectation that they will
win in the near future.
When any of above schemes is in operation, it is possible for us to detect it,
since the scheme creates a link between the outcome of each auction and history.
8A speech at Tokushima City Council by Councilor Satoru Kako, June, 2004.
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Competitive bidding, on the other hand, creates no such link. Therefore, we test if
the history impacts the auction result in a supposed way in Section 4.
4 Estimation of the model of the ring’s decision
In what follows, we analyze if the data can be explained by any of the collusion
schemes described above. Specifically, we examine if there is a factor that has
nothing to do with the cost, but has an impact on the auction result. The existence
of bid rigging is supported by the existence of such a factor. In the analysis, we
use the data from 123 auctions that did not result in the bidding war in the sense
described in Section 3.1.
An important assumption here is that the ring was all-inclusive in these auctions.
When the ring is all-inclusive in an auction, the designated winner wins the contract
for sure. Therefore, the winner’s characteristic in all-inclusive ring must reflect
characteristics of the collusion scheme.
4.1 Empirical model
Porter and Zona (1993) model the probability of a bidder’s win under competitive
bidding. They specify a bidder’s bidding function to be linear in observable cost
factors imposing an assumption that their coefficients are the same among firms,
and then analyze the probability of each bidder’s win given the cost factors as a
conditional logit model.
We extend their model by allowing the ring to designate the winner according
to the collusion schemes described in Section 3.2. Their model is adapted to the
ring’s choice as follows. We suppose that the ring chooses bidder i as the winner if
his measure of priority w∗it is the highest among the set of bidders Mt in auction t,
where
w∗it = β
′xit + γ ′zit + uit, i ∈ Mt. (1)
xit denotes the vector of factors that determine bidder i’s priority in the collusion
schemes. zit is a vector of observable variables affecting bidder i’s cost on project t.
uit is the disturbance that arises in bidder’s priority.
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The probability that bidder i is chosen as the winner in auction t conditional on
Mt and xt is written as:
Pr(wt = i | Mt, xt, zt) = Pr(w∗it ≥ w∗jt ∀j ∈ Mt, j = i | Mt, xt, zt),
where wt indicates the identity of the winner in auction t, and xt and zt are vectors
that consist of xit and zit for all i ∈ Mt, respectively. McFadden (1973) showed that
when the uit’s are independent and identically distributed with the Type I extreme
distribution, the above probability can be written as:
Pr(wt = i| Mt, xt, zt) = exp(β
′xit + γ ′zit)∑
j∈Mt exp(β
′xjt + γ ′zjt)
. (2)
We obtain the estimator of parameters by maximizing the following log likelihood
function:
lnL(β, γ|wt,Mt, xt, zt) =
∑
t∈S
∑
i∈Mt
eit ln Pr(wt = i| Mt, xt, zt),
where eit is an index variable which is 1 if i won in auction t and 0 otherwise and S
is the set of auctions that were not the bidding wars.
Recall that the determinant of bidder i’s priority in auction t is 1) the number of
days elapsed from i’s last win (simple rotation), 2) i’s total revenue up to t (revenue
equalization), 3) the number of wins and the number of losses up to t (contribution
point). Therefore, xit = (NUMDAYSit, WINVALUEit, WINNUMit, LOSENUMit).
We construct two variables which capture the revenue in the past, WINVALUE1it
and WINVALUE2it, since the ring may refer to the total revenue in a long time
or in a relatively short time in case that the revenue equalization scheme is used.
WINVALUE1it is the total value of contracts that Firm i has won since the start of
the data period until the date of auction t, and WINVALUE2it is that within half
a year of auction t. Since the total revenue and the number of wins in the past are
highly correlated, we estimate some specifications dropping either of them.
The variables which represent observable cost factors in our model are zit =
(CAPit, CAPSQit, YEARSi, WORKERi, PROFRATEi, DISTit, OUTOFTOWNi).
9
We also estimate a model with bidder specific intercept αi in w
∗
it.
9In Porter and Zona (1993), the cost factors zit include the capacity utilization rate (CAPit),
squared utilization rate (CAPSQit), a firm’s maximum capacity, squared maximum capacity, and
only CAPit and CAPSQit are statistically significant.
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Since we are interested in whether xit has an impact on the winning probability,
we test the null hypothesis H0 : β = 0 against H1 : β = 0.
We also try the following extension in which the impact of xit on the priority is
allowed to be different across bidders:
w∗it = e
δiβ′xit + γ ′zit + uit. (3)
This extension allows us to estimate the schemes which treat the ring members
differently. Bidders may be treated differently because, for example, some are more
established members of the ring than the others. We set δ1 = 0 for bidder 1. The
greater the value of δi the better treatment does bidder i receive.
4.2 Result
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the conditional logit model. We have esti-
mated both models with and without bidder fixed effects. Columns (1)-(6) shows
the results of equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) contain the results using WIN-
VALUE1 as the proxy for the total revenue in the past, and columns (3) and (4) use
WINVALUE2. Columns (5) and (6) show the results using the number of wins in the
past, instead of the total revenue. Column (7) corresponds to the extended model
which allows the heterogeneity of bargaining power given in equation (3). Columns
(8) and (9) show the estimation results of equation (1) under the assumption β = 0.
In all specifications except for (8) and (9), the coefficient of NUMDAYS, the
length of time since the last win, is positive and statistically significant at 1% level.
It can be said that the impact of the duration of no win period has a robust positive
impact on the winning probability. The total revenue in the past is negative in
all columns and statistically significant at 1% or 5 % in columns (2), (3) and (4).
These results suggest that either simple rotation scheme or the combination of simple
rotation and revenue equalization is most likely used. That is, the ring selects the
winner based on the duration of the winless period and the winning value up to the
auction.
The coefficient of the OUTOFTOWN dummy is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at least 5% level in all columns, suggesting that having a headquarter in
the city increases the firm’s bargaining power in collusive negotiations. Table 3 also
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shows that the number of win tends to be small if a firm is out-of-town. Firms 1,2,6
and 11 are out-of-town firms, and they won half as many times as the local firms.
These findings can be the evidence of collusion if competitive bidding is never
affected by the duration of the winless period. However, there remains a possibility
that the duration of no win creates financial difficulty which leads to more aggressive
bidding in competitive paradigm. When bidders are in financial difficulty, their
objective is not to maximize the profit but to earn for the operational expenses
immediately. If this is the case, it is natural that the winner tends to have a longer
winless period or a less amount of win in the past.
In order to see if these properties lead to aggressive bidding, we examine their
impact on the bid levels of losing bids. Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of OLS
estimations and Tobit estimations, respectively.
In Table 6, estimations in the first four columns use all bids in non-bidding
war auctions, whereas only losing bids are used in the remaining columns. The
dependent variable of columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) is the normalized bid, and that
of the remaining columns is log of the normalized bid. It can be seen that the
impact of NUMDAYS is significant and has expected sign in the results using all
bids (columns (1)-(4)), whereas it turns out to be insignificant when winning bids
are removed from the dataset (columns (5)-(8)). The impact of WINVALUE2 is
insignificant throughout datasets and specifications.
In Table 7, the dependent variable of the Tobit models is the difference between
the bid level and the minimum price, divided by the difference between the reserve
price and the minimum price. In contrast to the OLS estimations, we include bid
data of bidding wars where the dependent variable is left truncated at the minimum
price. All bids are used in the first two columns, and only losing bids are used in
the latter two columns. In all columns, WINVALUE2 is significant but NUMDAYS
is not.
In summary, there is little support for the alternative explanation for the results
of the conditional logit model that the positive impact of the duration of the winless
period and the negative impact of the winning value up to the auction, on the
winning probability is due to financial difficulty. We therefore conclude that those
impacts are due to collusion.
The reuslts in columns (8) and (9) in Table 5 show that when we omit variables
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such as NUMDAYS in the conditional logit model, CAP turns out to be significant.
It means that when our data are analyzed using a model with only cost relevant
terms, the estimation result looks competitive because of the negative correlation
between CAP and NUMDAYS. We confirm that it is difficult for the standard model
to discriminate whether the data are competitive or collusive when the ring uses bid
rotation.
We should note that there may exist other factors omitted in our model. Figure 5
shows the relationship between the size of the contract and the identity of the winner.
A small, medium, big dot indicates a small (less than 5 million yen), medium (5-10
million yen) and big (greater than 10 million yen) contract, respectively. It can be
seen from the figure that firm 3 tends to win big contracts with long intervals, while
firms 9 and 10 tend to win small or medium contracts with short intervals. This
suggests the presence of firm specific patterns not captured in our analysis.
5 Conclusion
We analyze procurement auction data to determine if bid rigging is present. We first
observe the incidents of the bidding war and find that most bidding wars occurred
when either of specific two firms submitted bids. It is inferred that the two firms are
possible outsiders and that all the ring bidders submit bids at the minimum price
only when the outsiders were in the auction.
We next analyze if the auction results is explained by some collusion scheme
in which the ring chooses the winner based on the history of auctions, assuming
that the auction is all-inclusive if it is not a bidding war. Specifically, we model
four collusion schemes typically used in Japan, as the ring’s multinomial choice of
the winner. In the schemes, the ring compares each member’s priority to win, and
selects the member whose priority is the greatest among the bidders. The members’
priority is measured based on the history. It is found that a bidder tends to win
when his duration of no win is long, and his amount of win in the past is low relative
to other bidders.
The duration of no win or the win value in the past may be related to the financial
pressure which makes a competitive bidder aggressive, and therefore, their impacts
can be due to competition. We further confirm that there is little support for such
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an explanation by analyzing the bid level of losing bids. We then conclude that the
impacts of those variables on the winning probability are due to collusion.
Our finding figures out the behavior of the ring. The ring allocates contracts
to the ring bidders, balancing the frequency of winning and the revenue among its
members, and when an outsider is in an auction, all the ring bidders bid at the
minimum price.
We should note the limitation of our approach. First, the measure of bidders’
backlog is inaccurate since it is based only on the public contracts and their private
contracts are not taken into account. Second, the correlation between the current
result and the past results in competitive auctions may come from some unknown
causality other than capacity constraint or financial pressure, but we do not handle
it. Finally, our analysis is effective only when the ring is nearly all inclusive in the
market and multimarket contact of bidders is infrequent. Otherwise it is difficult
for us to analyze if the auction results are consistent with some collusion scheme.
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Table 4: Definition of variables
Variable name Description Num.Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CAPit The measure of capacity utilization.
Defined as the value of backlog con-
tracts divided by the firm’s annual
sales in 2004. (If the firm has more
than two offices, sales are divided by
the number of the offices.) Firm i’s
backlog contract at auction t is the
contract won by Firm i in public auc-
tions in Ibaraki City or Osaka Pre-
fecture, overlapping the contract of
auction t.
725 0.04 0.07 0 0.59
CAPSQit Square of CAP. 725 0.01 0.02 0 0.35
YEARSi Years since Firm i’s establishment,
as of 2004.
725 24.74 10.58 6 55
WORKERi Number of technical employees of
Firm i, as of 2004, divided by the
number of offices.
725 9.57 5.24 3 19
PROFRATEi Profit-sales ratio as of 2004. 725 0.53 2.64 -9.50 5.79
DISTit Direct distance in kilometer between
the work site and Firm i’s office.
725 3.64 2.29 0.21 14.92
OUTOFTOWNi A dummy variable that takes 0 if
Firm i has a headquarter in Ibaraki
City, and 1 otherwise.
725 0.18 0.39 0 1
NUMDAYSit The number of days between Firm
i’s last winning and the date of auc-
tion t.
725 106.31 112.50 0 695
WINVALUE1it The total value of contracts that
Firm i has won since the start of the
data period until the date of auction
t (in million yen).
725 47.04 39.13 0 176.27
WINVALUE2it The total value of contracts that
Firm i has won within half a year
of auction t (in million yen).
725 10.56 9.53 0 47.04
WINNUMit The number of times that Firm i won
in auctions from the start of the data
period until the date of auction t.
725 6.67 4.77 0 20
LOSENUMit The number of times that Firm i lost
in auctions from the start of the data
period until the date of auction t.
725 31.90 21.40 0 82
19
Table 5: Estimation results for conditional logit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
WINVALUE1 -0.010 -0.027** -0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
WINVALUE2 -0.033* -0.038*
(0.016) (0.018)
WINNUM -0.065 -0.139
(0.060) (0.077)
LOSENUM 0.006 0.031 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.021
(0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020)
NUMDAYS 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
CAP -3.810 -5.978 -2.126 -3.401 -3.793 -5.100 -3.587 -8.586* -9.804*
(3.985) (4.116) (4.186) (4.291) (4.022) (4.106) (4.809) (3.834) (3.941)
CAPSQ 5.024 7.278 2.500 3.310 4.587 5.119 3.603 12.012 12.391
(10.120)(10.690)(11.235)(11.785)(10.032)(10.560)(12.354)(9.478) (9.863)
YEARS -0.004 -0.042 -0.002 -0.047 0.002 -0.042 -0.018 -0.005 -0.018
(0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.027) (0.011) (0.024)
WORKER -0.013 0.011 -0.021 -0.069 -0.034 -0.079 0.089 -0.032 -0.044
(0.026) (0.057) (0.024) (0.046) (0.022) (0.045) (0.053) (0.020) (0.039)
PROFRATE -0.052 0.032 -0.053 0.033 -0.065 0.029 -0.367* -0.037 0.018
(0.056) (0.071) (0.055) (0.070) (0.056) (0.071) (0.149) (0.052) (0.061)
DIST -0.146** -0.114 -0.152* -0.125 -0.139* -0.116 -0.107 -0.129* -0.121
(0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.061) (0.062)
OUTOFTOWN -2.287** -1.722* -2.300** -1.728* -2.561** -1.750* -3.349* -0.822* -0.212
(0.560) (0.732) (0.552) (0.734) (0.659) (0.790) (1.477) (0.391) (0.521)
δ2 0.108
(0.263)
δ3 -1.179
(0.797)
δ4 -0.005
(0.384)
δ5 -1.191
(1.017)
δ6 -0.092
(0.244)
δ7 0.620
(0.384)
δ8 -0.240
(0.502)
δ9 0.201
(0.456)
δ10 -0.034
(0.552)
δ11 -1.791
(1.256)
δ12 0.273
(0.461)
Bidder fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes
Log likelihood -194.23 -187.70 -193.39 -189.65 -195.15 -190.52 -181.30 -208.71 -206.13
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.135 0.108 0.126 0.100 0.122 0.164 0.037 0.049
IIA violation Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes:
(i) **: 1% significance level, *: 5% significance level.
(ii) The number of observations of each model is 725.
(iii) ‘Yes’ in ‘IIA violation’ implies that the Hausman test suggests that the model violates
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption.
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Table 7: Estimation results of Tobit models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reserve price -6.165∗∗ -6.425∗∗ -6.393∗∗ -7.020∗∗
(1.485) (1.494) (1.601) (1.606)
CAP 0.595 0.779∗ 0.496 0.799∗
(0.320) (0.335) (0.353) (0.371)
CAPSQ -1.244 -1.547 -0.721 -1.173
(0.805) (0.820) (0.869) (0.885)
YEARS -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
WORKER -0.002 0.034∗∗ -0.004 0.030∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
PROFRATE 0.002 -0.014∗∗ 0.001 -0.015∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
DIST -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
OUTOFTOWN 0.111∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.336∗∗
(0.036) (0.048) (0.039) (0.052)
WINVALUE2 0.324∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.389∗∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.123) (0.130) (0.135) (0.143)
NUMDAYS -0.043 -0.042 0.035 0.020
(0.111) (0.114) (0.127) (0.130)
Intercept 0.714∗∗ - 0.728∗∗ -
(0.040) (0.044)
Num. of Obs. 812 812 673 673
Log-likelihood -220.398 -216.398 -186.183 -179.038
Bidder Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes
Notes:
(i) **: 1% significance level, *: 5% significance level.
(ii) The definition of the dependent variables:
(bid level−minimum price)/(reserve price−minimum price)
(iv) The units of Reserve price and NUMDAYS are in 109 yen and 1000 days, respectively.
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